IN Brief:
- The Consultative Shipping Group comprises 18 maritime countries committed to open access to shipping markets.
- Members warn that conflict and shadow-fleet activity are eroding established maritime trading norms.
- Less predictable navigation, enforcement, and vessel oversight increase long-term supply-chain risk.
Eighteen maritime nations have warned that the common rules supporting international shipping are under increasing strain as conflict, contested navigation, sanctions, and the growth of less transparent vessel operations fragment the environment in which global trade moves.
The Consultative Shipping Group brings together countries in Europe, Asia, and Canada that support open and unimpeded access to international maritime markets. Denmark has held the group’s chairmanship and secretariat since 2007.
The group’s concern reaches beyond individual freight-rate movements or a single disrupted shipping lane. It centres on whether commercial vessels can continue operating under sufficiently consistent expectations around navigation, safety, ownership, insurance, and enforcement when geopolitical disputes increasingly reach into maritime transport.
That matters because ocean shipping remains the physical link between many of the world’s manufacturing and commodity supply chains. When ships have to avoid routes, change operating practices, or undergo additional compliance checks, the effects move into transit times, inventory, equipment utilisation, and procurement costs.
Fragmentation creates different operating conditions at sea
One source of concern is the expansion of vessels commonly described as shadow fleets, particularly in trades affected by sanctions. These ships can involve less transparent ownership structures, older tonnage, uncertain insurance arrangements, and operating practices that sit outside the mainstream networks used by conventional carriers and commodity traders.
The problem is not confined to the cargo carried on those vessels. Ships share waterways, ports, anchorages, and traffic separation schemes, so weak transparency or inadequate financial cover can create wider safety and liability questions when collisions, pollution, mechanical failures, or other incidents occur.
European maritime authorities have already placed increased emphasis on vessels maintaining valid documentation, insurance or financial security, safety-management systems, and compliance with established international conventions while exercising freedom of navigation.
That creates a growing compliance burden for companies dealing with shipping. Charterers, ports, insurers, banks, bunker suppliers, cargo owners, and freight intermediaries may need to examine ownership, sanctions status, flag, insurance, and counterparties more closely before a routine transaction can proceed.
Conflict adds another source of fragmentation. Red Sea attacks, disruption around strategically important Middle Eastern waters, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and other security events have shown how rapidly routes that are commercially normal can become subject to additional risk assessments or avoidance.
The operational response is familiar even when the cause differs: longer voyages, additional fuel consumption, higher insurance costs, altered port rotations, more inventory tied up in transit, and greater uncertainty over arrival dates.
Predictable rules have economic value
The CSG’s long-standing position in favour of open shipping markets rests on a practical assumption: operators can build networks more efficiently when access to ports and routes is governed by broadly recognised rules rather than a shifting collection of national restrictions.
If that predictability weakens, transport capacity becomes more exposed to political decisions. Governments can prioritise national security, sanctions enforcement, strategic cargo, or domestic interests, while carriers alter routes and commercial exposure in response.
Manufacturers and distributors then have to compensate through their own networks. Longer or less dependable maritime routes can lead to larger safety stocks, earlier ordering, different ports, alternative suppliers, or increased use of air and rail for selected cargo.
Those decisions carry costs that persist beyond a single freight invoice. Moving a distribution centre, qualifying a new supplier, holding more working capital in inventory, or redesigning a sourcing model can take months or years, which is why predictable shipping conditions retain value even when headline freight rates appear manageable.
Insurance and vessel oversight form part of the same framework. Mainstream shipping relies on flag-state control, classification, recognised insurance, and international conventions that provide traceability and mechanisms for dealing with casualties or pollution.
A larger pool of vessels operating with limited transparency complicates those arrangements and can leave authorities or other commercial parties with greater uncertainty over responsibility and recovery when incidents occur.
The CSG is not arguing that global maritime trade has stopped functioning. Container volumes remain high and most cargo continues moving. Its concern is that the common framework underneath that trade is becoming more difficult to maintain as security disputes and sanctions create parallel operating practices.
Supply-chain resilience therefore extends beyond obtaining enough vessel capacity. Companies increasingly need to consider the legal status of routes, vessel and counterparty transparency, sanctions exposure, insurance, and the possibility that established corridors become unavailable or commercially unattractive with limited notice.
Freight markets can absorb expensive detours and temporary congestion because operators can price those costs and plan around them. A less predictable rule set is harder to manage. It changes not only the price of moving cargo but the assumptions on which shipping networks, sourcing strategies, and inventory policies were built.


