Ten governments agree strategic supply chain cooperation

Ten governments agree strategic supply chain cooperation

Ten governments outlined joint security priorities for strategic supply chains. The San Francisco Declaration proposes cooperation on sensitive technologies, logistics infrastructure, and security, but has not yet established binding procurement rules or funded projects.


IN Brief:

  • The US and nine Pax Silica partners issued the San Francisco Declaration on 15 November 2026.
  • The declaration covers sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure, explicitly including ports, freight networks, energy, and digital platforms.
  • Five working groups are proposed; the declaration supplies no named chairs, budgets, or implementation timetable.

The US Department of State says ten governments signed the San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Enduring Prosperity on 15 November, adopting common language on the protection of technologies and infrastructure used in advanced artificial intelligence supply chains. Agreed at the Pax Silica Founders Retreat, the declaration proposes five areas for further cooperation. Its published text does not impose new customs procedures, supplier certification requirements, or funded infrastructure projects.

The United States signed alongside Australia, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom, according to the governments listed on the released text. Jacob Helberg, the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, convened the meeting. Together, the participants span semiconductor production, industrial technology, materials sourcing, energy infrastructure, finance, and global logistics, although the declaration allocates no individual supply contracts or manufacturing responsibilities.

The declaration identifies two classes of assets for protection. Sensitive technologies encompass goods, software, materials, knowledge, components, production inputs, and the means of making them where unauthorised transfer could create military, intelligence, or economic security risks. Critical infrastructure covers the physical and digital systems underpinning those supply chains: ports, terminals, transport and logistics networks, communications, information technology, energy infrastructure, and the platforms coordinating their operation.

The inclusion of freight infrastructure puts logistics systems within the same security framework as chipmaking tools and specialist materials. Sensitive goods can be delayed if a port operating system is unavailable, a terminal is disrupted, or the information required to release a shipment becomes compromised. The text also recognises unauthorised exposure of data flowing through critical networks as a risk. It does not, however, specify technical security controls for carriers, port operators, or logistics software providers.

Participants propose work in five areas: policy frameworks supporting innovation; adoption of advanced AI in important sectors; cooperation across the technology supply chain; safe harbours and supply chain security hubs; and security and resilience. These headings identify possible future coordination rather than programmes with published budgets, chairs, or delivery dates. Establishing the working groups and determining what they will pursue remain next steps.

The declaration places particular emphasis on reducing excessive dependence on concentrated supply sources and developing trusted capabilities across participating economies. Manufacturing networks for advanced computing rely on specialised equipment, process chemicals, components, energy, and transport services that are not equally available in every country. Disruption at a concentrated supplier or logistics node can affect several purchasers simultaneously, but the agreement neither quantifies those exposures nor names specific alternative sourcing projects.

Export licensing, customs clearance, investment screening, and supplier eligibility are still governed by the applicable laws and rules in each market. The governments reaffirm cooperation on enforcing their existing policies to protect sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure; the declaration itself does not amend those policies. Any new screening standard or procurement restriction would require subsequent rules or decisions from the relevant national authorities.

Protecting a shared technology supply chain can involve information held by manufacturers, freight operators, terminal owners, energy providers, and cloud platforms. Identifying vulnerabilities across those organisations requires cooperation while respecting commercial confidentiality and national data restrictions. Participants have not yet described a common method for exchanging operational information, assigning responsibility after an incident, or verifying the security of a particular logistics system.

The document calls the technologies concerned with “super intelligence”, or SI, but expressly notes that some participants use the term to mean artificial intelligence. This terminology does not establish a shared technical performance threshold for an AI system. The declaration focuses instead on the goods, expertise, production capabilities, and infrastructure that the governments regard as strategically sensitive.

The participating economies occupy different positions in existing supply networks. Japan and South Korea are significant producers of semiconductor materials, equipment, and devices; India and Singapore are linked to manufacturing and logistics operations; Gulf participants provide energy and infrastructure investment connections. Those existing roles provide possible subjects for coordination, but the document does not assign national quotas, identify procurement beneficiaries, or commit members to buying from one another.

Formation of the proposed working groups, publication of their remit, and subsequent policy or investment commitments will show whether the agreement changes supply chain operations. Until specific measures follow, the 15 November declaration remains a common statement of protection priorities covering both sensitive industrial technologies and the logistics systems on which their movement depends.


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