IN Brief:
- Four of six major ex-Asia trades now have backhaul utilisation of 30% or less.
- Far East-Europe has deteriorated from roughly 50% utilisation in 2020 to around 30% in 2026.
- Persistent imbalance increases equipment repositioning costs and leaves head-haul cargo carrying more network expense.
Sea-Intelligence has found that container trade imbalances on most major export routes from the Far East are continuing to worsen, increasing the amount of empty equipment carriers must reposition and leaving head-haul cargo to support more of the economics of each round trip.
The analyst’s rolling 12-month measure shows backhaul utilisation at 30% or less on four of the six major ex-Asia trades assessed. The measure compares loaded backhaul volume with loaded head-haul volume, indicating how much return-leg cargo is available relative to the outbound flow.
Far East-North America, the largest trade in the study, is running at an imbalance ratio of 26.7%. The route moved sharply away from its pre-pandemic pattern during 2020 and has since settled broadly within a 25% to 30% range, suggesting that heavily one-sided container flows have become structural rather than temporary.
Far East-Europe has deteriorated further. Its imbalance ratio has fallen from around 50% in 2020 to roughly 30% in 2026, and the direction has yet to stabilise. Carriers therefore continue to face a substantial mismatch between the boxes required in Asian export markets and the comparatively limited volume of loaded equipment moving back from Europe.
The Far East-Indian Subcontinent and Middle East trade has followed a similar course, moving from around 40% until 2023 to approximately 30% now. Far East-Sub-Saharan Africa has also reversed after several years of improvement and currently stands at 28.1%, while Far East-South and Central America remains below 40%.
Australia and Oceania is the clear exception. The smallest trade in the comparison remains the most balanced, with return utilisation around 60%, and is the only route in the group that has not shown a worsening imbalance.
For container shipping networks, those ratios translate directly into movements that consume cost without producing corresponding freight revenue. A box discharged in Europe, North America, or Africa may need to be repositioned empty towards an Asian export gateway, either on the same vessel network or through a sequence of feeder, depot, rail, and road moves.
Every repositioning absorbs terminal handling, vessel slots, inland transport, depot space, equipment management, and working capital. The box is still moving through the network, but it is no longer earning revenue from cargo.
The operational problem becomes more severe when export demand is concentrated in particular Chinese and wider Asian gateways. Carriers need the correct equipment type in the correct location before bookings are accepted, meaning a container fleet can appear adequately supplied at global level while individual ports or inland origins remain short of dry boxes, reefers, or specialised equipment.
Equipment availability therefore becomes a network-planning issue rather than simply a fleet-size question. An exporter may find vessel space available but still face delays because the required container is stranded hundreds or thousands of kilometres away in a weak backhaul market.
The commercial effect is equally important. A round trip has to recover vessel, fuel, terminal, equipment, port, and network costs across both directions, but weak backhaul demand leaves fewer paying loads over which to spread those costs. Head-haul customers consequently carry a larger share of the economics even where competition prevents carriers from passing every repositioning expense directly into freight rates.
That complicates procurement. A low spot rate on one leg does not necessarily indicate an efficient trade if the carrier is discounting aggressively to attract scarce backhaul cargo. Stronger pricing on the opposite leg may partly reflect the cost of returning empty equipment to the origin markets where it is most valuable.
Shippers comparing routes therefore need to look beyond a single quoted rate. Equipment availability, free-time terms, surcharges, inland positioning, port congestion, and the likelihood of capacity adjustments can all influence the actual cost and reliability of the movement.
Persistent imbalance can also alter service design. Carriers may change port rotations, blank sailings, depot strategies, feeder patterns, or empty-equipment flows to get boxes back towards export markets. Those decisions can reduce the apparent simplicity of a weekly service because container availability at inland origins may move differently from advertised vessel capacity.
The widening gap is emerging while Asia-Europe and transpacific networks are already absorbing geopolitical disruption, tariff changes, and uneven demand. Empty-container repositioning does not stop trade, but it reduces network efficiency by consuming capacity to move packaging rather than cargo.
Manufacturers and importers should therefore treat equipment positioning as part of service reliability. A carrier can have ship space and still struggle to supply the required container at the required origin, particularly during sharp export surges or after equipment has accumulated in import-heavy markets.
Sea-Intelligence’s latest figures suggest the problem is no longer a short-lived post-pandemic distortion on several major routes. With Far East-Europe still deteriorating and four trades at or below 30% backhaul utilisation, carriers face a continuing requirement to move large numbers of empty boxes through networks already under pressure.
The result is a structurally inefficient round trip: one leg moves the cargo, while the other increasingly moves the equipment needed to make the next loaded journey possible.
