IN Brief:
- Export associations estimate that Pakistan’s nine-day goods transport strike caused losses of around Rs450 billion.
- Reported container rates to both US coasts have risen by more than 300%.
- Missed sailings have shifted the disruption from inland transport towards vessel capacity and accumulated export cargo.
Pakistan’s export supply chains are absorbing a second round of disruption after a nine-day goods transport strike stranded containers inland, caused missed vessel cut-offs, and left exporters competing for reduced shipping space at sharply higher reported freight rates.
The stoppage began on 8 August and interrupted container movements from factories and warehouses towards Karachi Port and Port Qasim. Export associations estimate losses of around Rs450 billion during the nine-day period, equivalent to roughly Rs50 billion a day, with textiles, garments, knitwear, leather goods, and towels among the sectors affected.
The Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers & Exporters Association and other export groups say the disruption did not end when road transport resumed. Containers that missed terminal cut-offs also missed booked sailings, creating rollovers, storage, detention, demurrage, and rebooking costs while delayed cargo re-entered the system alongside new production.
Freight indications cited by exporters show rates to the US West Coast rising from about $1,800 to $8,500 per container, an increase of roughly 372%. Rates to the US East Coast were reported at around $8,000, compared with about $1,800 previously, while additional general rate increases and surcharges of up to $1,000 per container were reported during 14 and 15 August.
The figures are exporter reports rather than published carrier tariffs, and exporters have also alleged that shipping lines reduced Pakistan allocations and redirected capacity to other markets during the strike. The scale and duration of any such capacity reduction will determine how quickly the backlog clears once inland transport has normalised.
Backlog shifts towards vessel capacity
The first constraint was straightforward: trucks could not move export containers from production sites and warehouses to Pakistan’s main maritime gateways. Once the strike ended, those accumulated loads began moving at the same time as newly produced cargo, placing additional pressure on terminals, freight forwarders, hauliers, and vessel allocations.
Missed sailings create a longer recovery cycle than a road stoppage alone. A truck can return to service as soon as the road network reopens, whereas a rolled container needs space on a later sailing, with the next available vessel potentially carrying its own pre-booked cargo.
Pakistan’s export terms also distribute the direct freight cost unevenly. Export groups estimate that around 65% of shipments move on free-on-board terms, under which the overseas buyer normally arranges the main international freight leg, while roughly 35% move under cost-and-freight or other arrangements where the Pakistani seller carries more of the transport cost.
FOB terms do not remove the operational exposure. A shipment can still miss a contractual or seasonal delivery window, incur storage or detention charges, or require rebooking even when the overseas buyer ultimately pays the ocean freight.
Apparel and home-textile orders are particularly sensitive to delivery schedules because production and shipment dates are commonly tied to retail buying cycles. A delayed container can therefore create a commercial problem beyond the freight bill if the customer no longer needs the goods on the original timetable.
Capacity recovery sets the pace
Export associations are calling for government engagement with shipping lines, port authorities, terminal operators, freight forwarders, transport companies, and exporters. Their immediate concern is the restoration of vessel space as well as the physical clearance of containers accumulated during the strike.
Port gates may be open and trucks may be running, but a container cannot leave Pakistan until a carrier accepts it onto a sailing, and every missed departure extends the period during which inventory remains tied up at origin.
Higher freight and ancillary charges also increase working-capital requirements. Finished goods waiting for shipment continue to occupy warehouse space and absorb cash, while storage, detention, demurrage, rebooking, and higher ocean freight can all be added to orders that were priced before the disruption.
The effect is particularly acute for lower-margin exports. A freight movement that rises from about $1,800 to more than $8,000 can materially alter the economics of a shipment even before other disruption costs are included.
The Rs450 billion loss estimate reflects the stoppage period itself, but the final commercial cost will depend on how many containers are rolled, whether buyers cancel or defer orders, and how quickly carriers restore dependable allocations. Those outcomes are not yet known.
Pakistan’s logistics network has moved beyond the immediate road transport stoppage, but the backlog has not disappeared; it has shifted downstream. The practical measure of recovery will be the point at which exporters can again book predictable vessel space at commercially workable rates rather than simply move containers as far as the port.
